We introduce quittable consensus, a natural variation of the consensus problem, where processes have the option to agree on "quit" if failures occur, and we relate this problem to the well-known problem of non-blocking atomic commit. We then determine the weakest failure detectors for these two problems in all environments, regardless of the number of faulty processes.
Introduction
Non-blocking atomic commit (NBAC) is a well-known problem that arises in distributed transaction processing [8] . Informally, the set of processes that participate in a transaction must agree on whether to commit or abort that transaction. Initially each process votes Yes ("I am willing to commit") or No ("we must abort"), and eventually processes must reach a common decision, Commit or Abort. The decision to Commit can be reached only if all processes voted Yes. Furthermore, if all processes voted Yes and no failure occurs, then the decision must be Commit. NBAC is similar to the classical problem of consensus, where each process initially proposes a value, and eventually processes must reach a common decision on one of the proposed values.
It is well-known that NBAC and consensus are unsolvable in asynchronous systems with process crashes (even if communication is reliable) [6] . One way to circumvent such impossibility results is through the use of unreliable failure detectors [2] : In this model, each process has access to a failure detector module that provides some (possibly incomplete and inaccurate) information about failures, e.g., a list of processes currently suspected to have crashed. Chandra at al. [1] determined the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in systems with a majority of correct processes, while Delporte et al. [4] generalized this result to all systems, regardless of the number of correct processes. Informally, D is the weakest failure detector to solve problem P if (a) there is an algorithm that uses D to solve P , and (b) any failure detector D that can be used to solve P can be transformed to D.
As with consensus, failure detectors can be used to solve NBAC [9, 7] . It was an open problem, however, whether there is a weakest failure detector to solve NBAC and, if so, what that failure detector is. In this paper we resolve this problem. To do so, (a) we introduce a natural variation of consensus, called quittable consensus (QC) -a problem that is interesting in its own right;
(b) we determine the weakest failure detector to solve QC; (c) we establish a close relationship between QC and NBAC; and (d) we use (b) and (c) to derive the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC.
Informally, QC is like consensus except that, in case a failure occurs, processes have the option (but not the obligation) to agree on a special value Q (for "quit"). This weakening of consensus is appropriate for applications where, when a failure occurs, processes are allowed to agree on that fact (rather than on an input value) and resort to a default action.
Despite their apparent similarity, QC and NBAC are different in important ways. In NBAC the two possible input values Yes and No are not symmetric: A single vote of No is enough to force the decision to abort. In contrast, in QC (as in consensus) no input value has a privileged role. Another way in which the two problems differ is that the semantics of the decision to abort (in NBAC) and the decision to quit (in QC) are different. In NBAC the decision to abort is sometimes inevitable (e.g., if a process crashes before voting); in contrast, in QC the decision to quit is never inevitable, it is only an option. Moreover, in NBAC the decision to abort signifies that either a failure has occurred or someone voted No; in contrast, in QC the decision to quit is allowed only if a failure has occurred.
We now describe in more detail our results, which involve the following three failure detectors.
• The leader failure detector Ω outputs the id of a process at each process. There is a time after which it outputs the id of the same correct process at all correct processes [1] .
• The quorum failure detector Σ outputs a set of processes at each process. Any two sets (output at any times and by any processes) intersect, and eventually every set consists of only correct processes [4] .
• The failure signal failure detector FS outputs green or red at each process. As long as there are no failures, FS outputs green at every process; after a failure occurs, and only if it does, FS must eventually output red permanently at every process [3, 9] .
We first show that there is a weakest failure detector to solve QC. This failure detector, which we denote Ψ, is closely related to the weakest failure detector to solve consensus, namely (Ω, Σ) [4] , 1 and to FS. Specifically, Ψ behaves as follows: For an initial period of time the output of Ψ at each process is ⊥. Eventually, however, Ψ either behaves like the failure detector (Ω, Σ) at all processes or, if a failure occurs, it may instead behave like the failure detector FS at all processes. The switch from ⊥ to (Ω, Σ) or FS need not occur simultaneously at all processes, but the same choice is made by all processes. This result has an intuitively appealing interpretation: To solve QC, a failure detector must eventually either truthfully inform all processes that a failure has occurred, in which case the processes can decide Q, or it must be powerful enough to allow processes to solve consensus on their proposed values. This matches the bevariour of Ψ.
We then prove that NBAC is equivalent to QC modulo the failure detector FS. More precisely we show that: (a) given FS, any QC algorithm can be transformed into an algorithm for NBAC, and (b) any algorithm for NBAC can be transformed into an algorithm for QC, and can also be used to implement FS.
Finally, we use this equivalence to prove that (Ψ, FS) is the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC. This result applies to any system, regardless of the number of faulty processes.
Related work. Several versions of the consensus problem have been studied before but, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to propose quittable consensus.
NBAC has been studied extensively in the context of transaction processing [8, 13] . Its relation to consensus was first explored in [11] . Charron-Bost and Toueg [3] and Guerraoui [9] showed that despite some apparent similarities, in asynchronous systems NBAC and consensus are in general incomparable -i.e., a solution for one problem cannot be used to solve the other. 2 The problem of determining the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC was explored and settled in special settings. Fromentin et al. [7] determine that to solve NBAC between every pair of processes in the system, one needs a perfect failure detector [2] . Guerraoui and Kouznetsov [10] determine the weakest failure detector for NBAC in a restricted class of failure detectors; while from results of [3] and [9] it follows that in the special case where at most one process may crash, FS is the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC. The general question, however, was open until the present paper.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we briefly review the model of computation, and define formally the failure detectorsΩ, Σ and FS. In Section 3 we give the exact specification of QC, and in Section 4 we prove that Ψ is the weakest failure detector to solve QC. In Section 5 we give the specification of NBAC, we prove that NBAC is equivalent to QC modulo FS, and we use this to show that (Ψ, FS) is the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC.
Model
We consider the asynchronous message-passing model in which processes have access to failure detectors [1, 2] . In this section we summarise the relevant terminology and notation.
The system consists of a set Π of n processes. Processes can fail only by crashing, i.e., prematurely halting. Each process executes steps asynchronously: the delays between steps are finite but unbounded and variable. Processes are connected via reliable links that transmit messages with finite but unbounded and variable delay.
A failure pattern is a function F : N → 2 Π , where F (t) denotes the set of processes that have crashed through time t. (We assume a discrete global clock used only for presentational convenience, and not accessible by the processes.) Crashed processes do not recover and so, for all t ∈ N, F (t) ⊆ F (t + 1). faulty(F ) = t∈N F (t) denotes the set of processes that crash in F , and correct(F ) = Π − faulty(F ) denotes the set of processes that are correct in F .
A failure detector history with range R describes the behaviour of a failure detector during an execution; formally, it is a function H : Π × N → R, where H(p, t) is the value of the failure detector module of process p at time t. A failure detector D with range R is a function that maps each failure pattern F to a set of failure detector histories with range R. Intuitively, D(F ) is the set of behaviors that D can exhibit when the failure pattern is F .
An algorithm A is an automaton that specifies, for each processp, (a) the set of messages that p can send; (b) the set of states that p can occupy (a subset of which are identified asp's possible initial states); and (c) a transition function which determines the messages that p sends and the new state it occupies when it takes a step. In one atomic step, p performs the following actions: it receives a message addressed to it (possibly the empty message λ), it queries the failure detector and receives its present value, it sends messages to other processes and changes its state. 3 The messages that p sends and the new state it occupies are specified by its transition function based on its present state, the message it receives and the value it was given by the failure detector. Formally, a step is a triple p, m, d , where p is the process taking the step, m is the message p receives in that step, and d is the failure detector value it sees in that step. A schedule S is a finite or infinite sequence of steps.
A configuration of algorithm A specifies the global state of the system, i.e., the state of each process and of the "message buffer" which contains the set of messages that have been sent but have not yet been received. An initial configuration of A is a configuration in which every process occupies an initial state and the message buffer is empty. The step e = p, m, d is applicable to configurationC if m is λ or m belongs to the message buffer of C and its recipient is p; in this case e(C) denotes the configuration that results if the present configuration is C, and process p executes the step in which it receives message m and sees failure detector value d. A schedule S = e 1 e 2 . . . is applicable to configurationC if and only if S is empty or e 1 is applicable to C, e 2 is applicable to e 1 (C) and so on. If S is a finite schedule applicable toC, S(C) denotes the configuration that results from applyingS to C.
A run of algorithm A using a failure detector D describes an execution of A where processes have access to D. Formally, a run (respectively, partial run) of algorithm A using a failure detector D is a tuple R = F, H, I, S, T where F is a failure pattern, H ∈ D(F ) is a failure detector history, I is an initial configuration of A, S is an infinite (respectively, finite) schedule ofA that is applicable to I, and T is an infinite (respectively, finite) increasing list of times indicating when each step inS occurred. A number of straightforward conditions are imposed on the components of runs and partial runs to ensure that the failure detector values that appear in the steps of the schedule are consistent with the failure detection history H, that processes don't take steps after crashing, and that (in runs) correct processes take infinitely many steps and messages are not lost. For details see [1] .
Some algorithms meet their specification only under some assumptions about the "environment" -e.g., that a majority of the processes are correct, or that two particular processes do not both crash. Formally, an environment E is a set of possible failure patterns. Intuitively, these are the failure patterns in which an algorithm of interest works correctly.
In Section 1 we informally introduced the failure detectors Ω, Σ, FS. We now define these formally.
• The range of Ω is Π. For every failure pattern F ,
• The range of Σ is 2 Π . For every failure pattern F ,
• The range of FS is {green, red}. For every failure pattern F ,
Quittable consensus (QC)
Informally, quittable consensus is a weaker version of consensus where, if a failure has occurred, processes can also agree on the special value Q. In the quittable consensus problem (QC), each process invokes the operation PROPOSE(v), where v ∈ {0, 1}, which returns a decision of 0, 1 or Q (for "quit"). It is required that:
Termination: If every correct process proposes a value, then every correct process eventually returns a decision.
Uniform Agreement: No two processes (whether correct or faulty) return different values.
Validity: A process may only decide a value v ∈ {0, 1, Q}. Moreover, (a) If v ∈ {0, 1} then some process previously proposed v.
(b) If v = Q then a failure previously occurred.
Here we defined the binary version of QC, where processes can propose values in the set{0, 1}. It is straightforward to generalise QC so that processes can propose values from an arbitrary set of at least two values that does not include the special value Q.
Code for each process p: 
The weakest failure detector to solve QC
We define a new failure detector denotedΨ and show that it is the weakest failure detector to solve QC in any environment. To prove this, we first show thatΨ can be used to solve QC in any environment. We then prove that, for every environment E, any failure detector that can be used to solve QC in E can be transformed into Ψ in E.
Specification of failure detector Ψ
Roughly speaking Ψ behaves as follows: For an initial period of time the output of Ψ at each process is ⊥. Eventually, however, Ψ behaves either like the failure detector (Ω, Σ) at all processes, or, in case a failure previously occurred, it may instead behave like the failure detector FS at all processes. The switch from ⊥ to (Ω, Σ) or FS need not occur simultaneously at all processes, but the same choice is made by all processes. Note that the switch from ⊥ to FS is allowable only if a failure previously occurred. Furthermore, if a failure does occur processes are not required to switch from ⊥ to FS; they may still switch to (Ω, Σ). More precisely, Ψ is defined as follows. For each failure patternF ,
Using Ψ to solve QC
It is easy to use Ψ to solve QC in any environment E (see Figure 1 ). Each process p waits until the output of Ψ becomes different from ⊥. At that time, either Ψ starts behaving like FS or it starts behaving like (Ω, Σ). If Ψ starts behaving like FS (Ψ can do so only if a failure previously occurred), p returns Q. The remaining case is that Ψ starts behaving like (Ω, Σ). It is shown in [4] that there is an algorithm that uses (Ω, Σ) to solve consensus in any environment. Therefore, in this case, processes propose their initial value to that consensus algorithm and return the value decided by that algorithm. In Figure 1 , CONSPROPOSE() denotes p's invocation of the algorithm that solves consensus using (Ω, Σ). Hence the following result:
Theorem 1 For all environments E, Ψ can be used to solve QC in E.
Code for each process p: p uses G p and the n + 1 initial configurations to construct a forestΥ p of ever-increasing simulated runs of algorithm A using D that could have occurred with the current failure pattern F and the current failure detector history H ∈ D(F ). 
Extracting Ψ from any failure detector that solves QC
Let D be an arbitrary failure detector that can be used to solve QC in some environment E; i.e., there is an algorithm A that uses D to solve QC in environment E. We must prove that Ψ can be "extracted" from D in environment E, i.e., processes can run in E a transformation algorithm that uses D and A to generate the output of Ψ -a failure detector that initially outputs ⊥ and later behaves either like (Ω, Σ) or like FS. The transformation algorithm that does this is shown in Figure 2 and is explained below. Each process p starts by outputting ⊥ (line 1). While doing so, p determines whether in the current run it is possible to extract (Ω, Σ), or it is legitimate to start behaving like FS and output red because a failure occurred, as follows.
In task 1, p simulates runs of A that could have occurred in the current failure detector history of D and the current failure pattern F , exactly as in [1] . It does this by "sampling" its local module of D and exchanging failure detector samples with the other processes (line 4). Process p organizes these samples into an everincreasing DAG G p whose edges are consistent with the order in which the failure detector samples were actually taken. Using G p , p simulates ever-increasing partial runs of algorithm A that are compatible with paths in G p (line 6). 4 Each process p organizes these runs into a forest of n + 1 trees, denoted Υ p . For any i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n], the i-th tree of this forest, denoted Υ i p , corresponds to simulated runs of A in which processes p 1 , . . . , p i propose 1, and p i+1 , . . . , p n propose 0. A path from the root of a tree to a node x in this tree corresponds to (the schedule of) a partial run of A, where every edge along the path corresponds to a step of some process.
In task 2, p waits until it decides in some run of every tree of the forest Υ p (line 8). If p decides Q in any of these runs, then a failure must have occurred (in the current failure pattern), and so p knows that it is legitimate to output red in this run. Otherwise (p's decisions in the simulated runs are 0s or 1s), p determines that it is possible to extract (Ω, Σ) in the current run.
At this point, p executes the given QC algorithm A (using failure detector D) to agree with all the other processes on whether to output red or to extract (Ω, Σ). Specifically, ifp has determined that it is legitimate to output red then it proposes 0 to A (line 11), otherwise it proposes (I, I , S, S ) (line 14) where I and I are initial configurations that differ only in the proposal of one process, andS and S are schedules in Υ p such that p decides 0 in S(I) and 1 in S (I ). 5 The following lemma proves that these configurations and schedules exist.
Lemma 2 If any process p reaches line 12 then there are initial configurations I and I , and schedules S and S in Υ p , such that (a) I and I differ only in the proposal of one process, and (b) p decides 0 in S(I) and 1 in S (I ).
PROOF SKETCH. If any process p reaches line 12, then in each tree of Υ p , p has a run in which it decides 0 or 1. In the tree where every process proposes 0 (respectively, 1), p's decision must be 0 (respectively, 1). The result immediately follows.
If A returns 0 or Q, then p stops outputting ⊥ and outputs red from that time on (line 18). If A returns a value of the form (I 0 , I 1 , S 0 , S 1 ), then p stops outputting ⊥ and starts extracting Ω (line 22) and Σ (lines 24-32). Ω is extracted as in [1] (see Section 4.3.1). Σ is extracted using novel techniques explained in Section 4.3.2.
Note that processes use the given QC algorithm A and failure detector D in two different ways and for different purposes. First each process simulates many runs of A to determine whether it is legitimate to output red or it is possible to extract (Ω, Σ) in the current run. Then processes actually execute A (this is a real execution, not a simulated one) to reach a common decision on whether to output red or to extract (Ω, Σ). Finally, if processes decide to extract (Ω, Σ), they resume the simulation of runs of A to do this extraction.
Extracting Ω
To extract Ω, p must continuously output the id of a process such that, after some time, correct processes output the id of the same correct process. This is done using the procedure of [1] , with some minor differences explained below.
As in [1] , because of the way each process p constructs its ever-increasing forest Υ p of simulated runs, the forests of correct processes tend to the same infinite limit forest, denotedΥ. The limit tree of Υ i p is denoted Υ i . Each node x of the limit forest Υ is tagged by the set of decisions reached by correct processes in partial runs that correspond to descendants of x.
In [1] the only possible decisions were 0 or 1, and so these were the only possible tags. Consequently, each node was 0-valent, 1-valent or bivalent (with two tags). Here there are three possible decisions (0, 1 or Q) so each node is 0-valent, 1-valent, Q-valent or multivalent (with two or three tags).
In [1] (and here) the extraction of the id of a common correct process relies on the existence of a critical index i in the limit forest Υ. Here we define i to be critical if the root of Υ i is multivalent (in which case it is called multivalent critical), or if the root of Υ i−1 is u-valent and the root of Υ i is v-valent, where u, v ∈ {0, 1, Q} and u = v (in which case it is called univalent critical).
In [1] it is shown that a critical index always exists. In this paper, however, this is not necessarily the case. If some process crashes (in the current failure pattern), it is possible that in all the simulated runs of QC algorithm A in Υ all decisions are Q. In this case, the roots of all trees in the limit forest Υ are tagged only with Q. So there is no critical index, and we cannot apply the techniques of [1] to extract the id of a correct process! This is why, in our transformation algorithm, processes do not always attempt to extract Ω from D. However, if a process actually attempts to extract Ω (in line 22) then a critical index does exist in the limit forest Υ, and so Ω can indeed be extracted: Lemma 3 If any process reaches line 22 then the limit forest Υ has a critical index.
PROOF SKETCH. If a process reaches line 22, then it previously decided a tuple of the form (I 0 , I 1 , S 0 , S 1 ) in line 15. Thus, by the Validity property of A, some process q (not necessarily correct) proposed some tuple in line 14. We first show that the limit forestΥ has some run where some correct process decides a value other than Q.
Since q proposed a tuple in line 14, it must have decided some value v = Q in some partial run R of A in Υ q . Before q proposed its tuple in line 14, it sent to all processes the finite path ofq's DAG (of failure detector samples) that gave rise to the partial run R. Thus, after receiving this path and integrating it in its own DAG, every correct process p also constructs partial run R (which is compatible with this path), and includes it in its own forest Υ p . So the partial run R where q decides v is also embedded in the limit forest Υ. Note that Υ includes an infinite runR * that extends R such that all the correct processes take an infinite number of steps in R * . By the Termination and Uniform Agreement properties of A, all the correct processes decide v (the same as q) in run R * . So Υ has a run where all correct processes decide v = Q.
From the above, the root of some tree Υ j of the limit forest Υ has tag v = Q. Without loss of generality, assume v = 0. Note that the root of tree Υ n , where all processes propose 1, must have a tag u = 0 (it can be 1 or Q). Therefore, some index i between j and n must be critical.
Extracting Σ
To extract Σ, p must continuously output a set of processes (quorum) such that the quorums of all processes always intersect, and eventually they contain only correct processes. This is done in lines 24-32 as follows.
When process p reaches line 24, it has agreed with other processes on two initial configurationsI 0 and I 1 and two schedules S 0 and S 1 that are applicable to I 0 and I 1 , respectively. Consider the set C of configurations of A obtained by applying all the prefixes ofS 0 and S 1 to I 0 and I 1 (line 25).
To determine its next quorum, p uses "fresh" failure detector samples to simulate runs of A that extend each configuration inC (lines 29-30). It does so until, for each configuration inC, it has simulated an extension in which it has decided (line 31). The quorum of p is the set of all processes that take steps in these "deciding" extensions (line 32).
Note that in line 27, p waits until it gets a new sample u from its failure detector module (which happens in line 4 of task 1) and then it uses only samples that are more recent than u to extend the configurations inC (lines 29-30). This ensures the freshness of the failure detector samples that p uses to determine its quorums. Consequently, quorums eventually contain only correct processes (one of the two requirements of Σ).
Sketch of the proof
Lemma 4 Let R 1 = F, H, I, S · S 1 , T · T 1 and R 2 = F, H, I, S · S 2 , T · T 2 be partial runs of A, such that the sets of processes that take steps in S 1 and in S 2 are disjoint and T 1 and T 2 contain distinct times. LetT be the merging of T 1 and T 2 (in increasing order) andŜ be the corresponding merging of S 1 and S 2 (i.e., the steps ofŜ are the steps of S 1 and S 2 in the order indicated byT ). ThenR = F, H, I, S ·Ŝ, T ·T is also a partial run of A.
Corollary 5
Let R 1 = F, H, I, S · S 1 , T · T 1 and R 2 = F, H, I, S · S 2 , T · T 2 be partial runs of A, such that the sets of processes that take steps in S 1 and in S 2 are disjoint and T 1 and T 2 contain distinct times. If some process decides x 1 in R 1 and some process decides x 2 in R 2 then x 1 = x 2 .
Lemma 6 For each correct process p, there is a time after which Σ-output p contains only correct processes.
PROOF SKETCH. Let p be a correct process. Note that: (a) p takes a new failure detector sample u infinitely often (in line 27), and (b) Σ-output p contains only processes that take steps after the most recent sample u taken by p. Since faulty processes eventually stop taking steps, there is a time after which Σ-output p does not contain any faulty process.
Lemma 7
Let p, q be any processes, Σ-output p and Σ-output q always intersect.
PROOF SKETCH. Recall that p and q agreed on a value of the form (I 0 , I 1 , S 0 , S 1 ) in a (real) execution of A (line 15). I 0 and I 1 are initial configurations that differ only in the proposal of one process, andS 0 and S 1 are (simulated) schedules of A in which some process decides 0 in S 0 (I 0 ) and 1 in S 1 (I 1 ). Thus, p and q also agree on the set of configurationsC that is obtained by applying all prefixes ofS 0 and S 1 to I 0 and I 1 , respectively.
More precisely, let S 0 = e 1 e 2 . . . e and S 1 = f 1 f 2 . . . f m (where the e i s and f j s are steps). Let C 0 = I 0 and
Let Q p and Q q be the values of Σ-output p and Σ-output q at any two times. We must prove that Q p ∩Q q = ∅. Suppose, for contradiction, that this is not the case.
Consider the iteration of the loop in lines 26-32 at the end of which p set Σ-output p to Q p . In that iteration, for each C i , 0 ≤ i ≤ , p determined a schedule σ 
Claim 7.2
For all i, 0 ≤ i < , x i+1 = x i ; and for all j, 0 ≤ j < m, y j+1 = y j .
PROOF SKETCH. Recall that C i+1 = e i+1 (C i ). Since Q p and Q q are disjoint, the sets of processes that take steps in σ p i and σ q i are disjoint. Thus, the process that takes step e i+1 does not take a step in at least one of σ Let r be the process such that I 0 and I 1 differ only in the initial value of r. Since Q p and Q q are disjoint, the sets of processes that take steps in σ PROOF SKETCH. Let A be any algorithm that uses D to solve QC in environment E. We show that the algorithm in Figure 2 uses A to transform D into Ψ in environment E. In that algorithm, each process p maintains a variable Ψ-output p . We now prove that the values that these variables take conform to the specification ofΨ. By inspection of Figure 2 , it is clear that Ψ-output p is either ⊥, or red (in which case we say it is of type FS), or a pair (q, Q) where q ∈ Π and Q ⊆ Π (in which case we say it is of type (Ω, Σ)).
(1) For each process p, Ψ-output p is initially ⊥ (line 1). If Ψ-output p ever changes value, it becomes of type FS forever (line 18) or of type (Ω, Σ) forever (lines 20-34).
(2) For all processes p and q, it is impossible for Ψ-output p to be of type FS and Ψ-output q to be of type (Ω, Σ) . This is because, by the Uniform Agreement property of A, p and q cannot decide different values in line 15.
(3) For each correct process p, eventually Ψ-output p = ⊥. To see this, let p be any correct process. Process p simulates a forest Υ p of ever-increasing partial runs of A as in [1] (see line 6). In this simulation, every tree in Υ p has runs in which all the correct processes take steps infinitely often. So, by the Termination property of QC, every tree in Υ p has a run in which p decides. Therefore, eventually all correct processes complete the wait statement in line 8, and execute A in line 11 or 14. By the Termination property of QC, eventually p decides in that execution of A, and stops waiting in line 15. Thus, p eventually sets Ψ-output p to a value other than ⊥ in line 18 or 34.
(4) For each process p, if Ψ-output p is red then a process previously crashed in the current run. To see this, let p be some process that sets Ψ-output p = red (line 18). Thus, p decides 0 or Q in the execution of A that it invoked in line 11 or 14. If p decides Q then the fact that some process has previously crashed in the current run follows immediately from part (b) of the Validity property of QC. If p decides 0 then from part (a) of the Validity property of QC, some process q proposed 0 in the execution of A that q invoked in line 11. This implies that q decided Q in one of the simulated runs of A that q has in its forest Υ q . Recall that these are runs that could have occurred with the current failure pattern. By part (b) of the Validity property of QC, this means that some process has previously crashed in the current run.
(5) If the Ψ-output variable of any process is ever of type (Ω, Σ), then there is a time after which, for every correct process p, Ω-output p is the id of the same correct process. To see this, suppose some Ψ-output becomes of type (Ω, Σ). Then, by (2) and (3) above, eventually the Ψ-output variable of every correct process also become of type (Ω, Σ). So every correct process sets its Ω-output variable repeatedly in line 22 using the extraction procedure described in [1] . Since processes reach line 22, by Lemma 3, a critical index exists in the limit forest Υ. By following the proof of [1] , it can now be shown that eventually all the correct processes extract the id of the same correct process. The only difference is that whenever [1] refers to a bivalent node, we now refer to a multivalent one, and whenever [1] refers to 0-valent versus 1-valent nodes, we refer here to u-valent and v-valent nodes where u, v ∈ {0, 1, Q} and u = v.
(6) If the Ψ-output variable of any process is ever of type (Ω, Σ) then: (a) for every correct process p, there is a time after which Σ-output p contains only correct processes, and (b) for every processes p and q, Σ-output p and Σ-output q always intersect. This is shown in Lemmas 6 and 7.
From the above, it is clear that the values of the variables Ψ-output conform to Ψ: For an initial period of time they are equal to ⊥. Eventually, however, they behave either like the failure detector (Ω, Σ) at all processes or, if a failure occurs, they may instead behave like the failure detector FS at all processes. Moreover, this switch from ⊥ to (Ω, Σ) or FS is consistent at all processes.
From Theorems 1 and 8, we have:
Using FS to relate NBAC and QC
We first show that NBAC is equivalent to the combination of QC and failure detectorFS. We then use this result to establish a relationship between the weakest failure detector to solve QC and the one to solve NBAC.
Theorem 10 NBAC is equivalent to QC and FS. That is, in every environment E: (a) Given failure detector FS, any solution to QC can be transformed into a solution to NBAC. (b) Any solution to NBAC can be transformed into a solution to QC, and can be used to implement FS.
PROOF. Let E be an arbitrary environment.
(a) The algorithm in Figure 4 uses FS to transform QC into NBAC in E.
(b) It is known that NBAC can be used to implement FS in any environment [3, 9] . Roughly speaking, processes use the given NBAC algorithm repeatedly (forever), voting Yes in each instance. At each process, the output of FS is initially green, and becomes permanently red if and when an instance of NBAC returns Abort. It remains to prove that any solution to NBAC in E can be transformed into a solution to QC in E. This transformation is shown in Figure 5 . PROOF. Let E be an arbitrary environment, and D be the weakest failure detector to solve QC in E. This means that: (i) D can be used to solve QC in E and (ii) any failure detector that solves QC in E can be transformed into D in E.
Let D = (D, FS). We must show that: (a) D can be used to solve NBAC in E, and (b) any failure detector that solves NBAC in E can be transformed into D in E. From Corollary 9 and Theorem 11, we immediately have:
Corollary 12 For all environments E, (Ψ, FS) is the weakest failure detector to solve NBAC in E.
Final remarks
In environments where a majority of processes are correct it is easy to implement the quorum failure detector Σ: Each process periodically sends "join-quorum" messages, and takes as its present quorum any majority of processes that respond to that message [4] . Therefore, in such environments Ψ is equivalent to a simpler failure detector, one which outputs just Ω where Ψ outputs (Ω, Σ). Our definitions of QC and NBAC do not allow a process to quit or abort because of a future failure. We could have defined these problems in a way that allows such behaviour, as in fact is the case in some specifications of NBAC in the literature. Our results also hold with these definitions, provided we make a corresponding change to the definitions of the failure detectors FS and Ψ: they are now allowed to output red in executions with failures even before a failure has occurred.
